From the curricula they construct, economists apparently regard the history of economics as a subdisciplinary field within economics, symmetric as a subfield with labor economics, public finance, or economic development. Indeed, that perspective is instantiated in the Journal of Economic Literature subject classification system. Based on their pedagogy, economists appear to believe that one studies core subjects to become socialized as an economist; then one masters several fields of specialization for teaching purposes; and finally one selects a problem in one of those fields in which to become a specialist as a scholar or researcher.
This argument parallels economists' ideas of what goes on in, say, mathematics, where basic work in algebra, analysis, and topology is thought to define the core training, which is followed by work in fields like algebraic number theory or Lie groups. Economists likewise believe that core work in mechanics (quantum, classical, statistical) and electromagnetism is followed by fieldwork in solid-state condensed matter or elementary particles.
Yet in neither mathematics nor physics does history have a place. While history of mathematics is occasionally found in undergraduate programs in mathematics, the history of physics (like the history of chemistry) is more usually taught in the department of history, possibly cross-listed in physics (or chemistry) if the scientists can bring themselves to offer credit for that which they consider to be nonscience. Of course, what is true in mathematics and physics and chemistry is now true in economics as well. Whereas once upon a time the history of economics was a required core course for economists, no longer is that so. But more to the point, in doctoral training programs in nearly all North American universities, the history of economics is not even a field course, and this is increasingly true in doctoral programs in Europe and the antipodes as well.
Despite this fact, History of Economics Society (HES) and European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET) presidential and distinguished fellow addresses employ a rhetoric of good health concerning the subdiscipline of the history of economics. Believing that this cheerfulness masked some real structural problems for the field, I began in 1999 to organize a group of scholars to consider the state of the history of economics as a discipline in the new millennium. The occasion for this review was the annual HOPE conference, in this case the HOPE 2001 conference, held (fittingly) in the Millennium Hotel just off the Duke campus in Durham, North Carolina, 27-29 April 2001. The conference was sufficiently animated that the discussions were continued in a closed mail-list through eh.net over the next few months.
The conference call did not circumscribe approaches to assessing the health of the subdiscipline, for there are a variety of ways to gauge this. Nevertheless, three main paths seemed to present themselves. The first is essentialist. If when considering how the subdiscipline fits into the larger disciplinary whole as a cognitive enterprise one finds that its health is essential to the health of the larger economics, then it follows that the subdiscipline must be maintained in a healthy way if economics is to prosper. That philosophical or theoretical move produces arguments that travel along specific lines. For instance, one may argue that since economics is a historical discipline (the essentialist move), not a scientific one, cutting economics off from historical argumentation is logically incoherent. Alternatively, one may argue that economics is a scientific discipline (the essentialist move), but that the best ways to do science themselves are contested, and so the most successful gambits of science in the past must be known in order to provide exemplars for better current and future practice. This kind of health assessment forces the argument that the history of economics has to play an important role in the field of economics and in the training of economists. 1 Second, as an alternative, one can explore measures of a discipline's actual-not ideal-health, where those appropriate measures could be variously faculty lines, new Ph.D. entrants, number of journals, attendance at annual meetings, funding for conferences, courses taught, and so on. This sociological framework for the discussion would assess health according to the increase or decrease of one, several, most, or all of the constructed metrics.
And third, for us as historians, it is natural to assess subdisciplinary health historically. Such a discussion would engage with the local and contingent circumstances of the evolution of the history of economics by reconstructing its context, or several contexts, in a thick and interesting narrative, perhaps in various voices. Philip Mirowski, who served with William Barber and Mark Blaug as a roving conference commentator, pointed out that despite the future-looking conference call, it was curious that the conferees did not utilize historians' tools to take the measure of the subdiscipline's health. That is, the historian's craft could perhaps have produced an account of the health of the subdiscipline with chapters like "Changes in the Undergraduate Economics Curriculum in England and Scotland: 1945-90" or , 1958-88 ." This, though, is not that book. My own suspicion is that historians of economics are generally unaccustomed to doing such historical work, so that complex, self-reflexive studies are difficult at best, and self-serving at worst, usually confirming a position defined in advance of evidence.
1. Probably the best recent statement of this argument was developed by Warren Samuels (1997) . But see the earlier piece by Bradley Bateman (1992) and, more recently, the article by Mark Blaug (2001) .
Thus the conferees' arguments actually followed two tracks, essentialist and sociological, only sometimes connecting one with the other. Essentialism itself took two primary forms, one of which was historiographic, reflecting alternative ways to write histories of economics. The second essentialist line concerned heterodox traditions. That is, the historical enterprise was, because it was essential to those crafts' rhetorical strategies, healthy within those heterodox traditions.
Although the millennial historiographic issues were the subject of the 2000 HES meetings in Vancouver, the record of which appeared in the Journal of the History of Economic Thought (JHET ) in June 2001, they also concerned the HOPE 2001 conferees, although less in the papers than in the discussions that tracked the presentations. The reason for this is simple: the discussions that the conference sought to develop about the health of the subdiscipline seemed to require participants to testify to the relevance of that health. Such testimony ordinarily took the form of a background or implicit commentary that "the health of the history of economics is important because . . . " Significantly, however, the conference did not address the issue that if most economists regard the history of economics as unimportant, perhaps historians of economics should respond with something other than, "They're wrong, and we should try to convince them of their error." In other words, what the conference lacked was a discussion along the lines of, "Suppose (as nearly all economists will argue) that the history of economics as a subdiscipline, as it is constituted today, is not and cannot be made to be important for the education of economists: discuss the implications of this for historians of economics." I believe that this nondiscussion is connected to a fundamental historiographic problem.
In his recent book On the Methodology of Economics and the Formalist Revolution the distinguished methodologist Terence Hutchison (2000, 11) makes the following argument: I agree, therefore, wholeheartedly with Colander's formulation of a main aim of methodological discourse as that of commenting on, and criticizing, the theorizing of economists, and explaining why what they are doing does not, and cannot, achieve results of the interest and relevance which they are apparently claiming or aiming at (often simply because conclusions of relevance and interest cannot follow from the assumptions, explicit or inexplicit, on which their theories are based: which are so seriously oversimplified as to mislead profoundly if applied to the actual economic world).
If one comes to the history of economics out of a concern that economics is misguided in some fundamental ways, out of a concern that contemporary economics somehow misses what is important about economic life and economic argumentation, one form that criticism may take is quite direct: one criticizes the way economics is done on the basis of some argument or other about the right way to do it, measuring current practice against transcendental standards.
In such a case, the economist will oftentimes turn to history because of a belief that, while current practice may not meet reasonable standards, at least at some point in the past economics as a practice was consistent with the canons of good economic argumentation. Indeed, if there were no past (positive) evidence of acceptable work, it would be very difficult to derive any sense of what would (normatively) constitute acceptable work in economics. Without some past exemplar, all one could argue would be that standards, transcendental or immanent, come from other forms of scholarly practice-physics, chemistry, biology, and so on-and that those standards ought be applied to an economics that has never come up to the mark.
If one does not want to hold economics to the standards of chemistry and physics though, modern failures must be based on wrong turns taken in the past. This is the argument of Hutchison, who has been quite clear in his belief that what he refers to as formalism has sidetracked economics from its appropriate concern with real phenomena and empirical testing of economic models.
It is not necessary here to take issue with Hutchison. 2 Rather, I will simply point out that critics such as Hutchison employ the history of economics in a particular fashion, one that structures how they will "do" history: for such scholars, historical writing is shaped by the methodologist's belief that present-day economics is a mess. Critical work in the history of economics will thus examine current economics to see how it got (at some point in the past) to be as bad as it is. This kind of history will often begin with current issues in economics and push the historical argument back in time to recover some kind of bifurcation, some place in the past when the road not taken would have been the better one.
Notice what Hutchison's argument requires of a historian. First, it requires that a historian not do economics the way many economists do it, as an exercise in Whiggish triumphalism. Paul Samuelson's Whig history would appear ruled out of court by Hutchison's argument, since whatever his belief about present work in economics, Samuelson would hardly suggest that it is misguided and on the wrong track. For economists imbued with the idea of progress, Hutchison is giving a very different set of instructions on how to interpret the past; he is asking economists to seek in the past a source of the degeneration that characterizes current research activity.
Suppose historians of economics were to take this advice. I submit that the history of economics would soon stand in the same relation to economics as creationism does to evolutionary biology. "They will be held in contempt" is too weak a forecast of the position of a small band of outsiders that sets itself up to criticize the fundamental analyses of a dominant scientific elite. If most economists understand the history of economics as an attack on mainstream economics, they will be hostile to the subdiscipline and its claims on common resources of faculty positions and students' time.
As the historian Ted Porter (1992, 235) has noted:
Technical history, after all, has often served an apologetic function. This, I must emphasize, is by now greatly attenuated in historical studies of natural science. I regret to add that history as legitimation is still very strong in the history of economics. And this, I think, may be the decisive reason why historical work on recent economics has made so little impression on a generation of historians who insist on their autonomy from science. Unfortunately, many historians of economics are so completely socialized as economists, and so little as historians, that the genre of historical study is not fully distinct from that of the review essay. The review essay surveys a field and assigns credit, almost always on the assumption that knowledge is steadily progressing. Far too much history of economics, still, aims to extend the review back twenty or fifty years by presenting the ideas of the economist on some modern question. The precursor, long dismissed as a category mistake in history of science, is still alive and well in economics, and this is almost inevitable so long as history of economics is written to meet the standards and presuppositions of ahistorical economists.
Porter's comments present a different set of problems from Hutchison's for the history of economics. Porter argues that histories of economics have been too much shaped by the concerns of economists. That is, historians of economics have been socialized as economists, and consequently their understanding of what constitutes a historical discussion is based on their interest in either legitimizing modern economics, by uncovering what has led to the present, or uncovering the errors of the past that the present theories and analyses rectify. Economists who are most interested in doing applied economics today-that is, nearly all economists writing research papers in North American institutionshave no interest whatsoever in historical reconstruction. They are concerned with how the present science has succeeded where the past science had failed. What Porter is arguing then is that the concern with current economic practice is a poor structure in which to do historical reconstructions. Suppose historians of economics were to take Porter's advice and stop writing histories based on the "presuppositions of ahistorical economists." The audience then would become, I suspect, scholars writing in the history of science and science studies. And as a subdiscipline, the history of economics would likely become even less interesting to economists than it is now, if that is possible.
Hutchison subverts historians of economics who appear content with economics, at least economics as it stands today, while Porter subverts economists who write history out of an "economics" interest. Now, most economists would appear, broadly speaking, to be practitioners of the neoclassical variety or, in smaller numbers, heterodox critics of that tradition. Thus taking Porter and Hutchison together, we are forced to conclude that few economists can reasonably take an interest in, let alone construct, a historical argument worth reading. The task is to carve out a space between the different parts excised by Porter and Hutchison. How much is left, and what kind of historical craft can be built upon it? The papers delivered by Margaret Schabas, Evelyn Forget, and Ross Emmett (in the so-called All-Canada Session) made connections between the history of economics and other traditions. In her essay, Margaret Schabas revisits her 1992 suggestion that historians of economics should break away from the economics discipline and join forces with historians of science. She reemphasizes that the historiographic standards of our subdiscipline need to reflect that connection, although the institutional arrangement should be whatever can be worked out to the advantage of individual scholars in particular places. After all, economics departments pay us more than history departments would. Evelyn Forget argues that biography as a genre is increasingly employed in a variety of studies and that autobiography-the autobiographical turn, as it has been called-is increasingly employed in theoretical work in a wide range of disciplines. Her question about the employment of biography and autobiography in the subdiscipline opens a set of questions for new connections. Ross Emmett, in an examination of the new world of information services in which historical scholarship finds a place, explored for the conferees the possibilities and problems that this new world has opened up. His attention to the emerging conflicts concerning intellectual property rights produced a near explosion at the conference as individuals were apprised of the difficulties that electronic access creates in the concept of authorship and ownership. That on-line access to journals means that authors' works will be formed and reformed by the copyright owners and publishers presents some complex issues for scholars in all disciplines, but some especially troublesome ones for those using archival material. As archival material is put on-line, it will be increasingly difficult for historians of economics to make use of those materials in the same way as they had in the past. Access will be easier, but utilization may very well be significantly more difficult.
A second essentialist line, concerning the history of economics and heterodox traditions, was developed more optimistically in the essays. As the contributions of Sheila Dow, Peter Boettke, and Anthony Brewer made clear, heterodox economics and the traditions of heterodox economics utilize historical argumentation in ways quite different from the practices of neoclassical economists. That is, the rhetoric of the heterodox traditions, how individuals argue and persuade one another, involves appeal to historical argument and older texts in ways that neoclassical economists find outside their ken. Indeed, the historical approach was called intrinsic to heterodox argumentation in the sense that game theorists would not appeal to a point of interpretation in The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in order to assess the merits of a particular form of an auction for offshore oil leases. Consequently, the history of economics has been a big tent-and certainly the HES, HETSA, and ESHET meetings a welcome tent-for heterodox economists to present historical argumentation as part of their own economic analysis. Because of the difficult and often contentious relationship between neoclassical and heterodox traditions, the linkage of heterodox traditions to the subdiscipline of the history of economics may make it difficult for mainstream economists to encourage the growth of, let alone accept the continued existence of, the history of economics: people seldom wish to proffer food by hand to those who bite. To the extent that economics may be increasingly intolerant of heterodoxies, "big tent" history of economics may be ever more marginalized.
It needs to be recognized, though, that a number of the conferees were quite unimpressed by the strong claims made about the important role of historical reconstructions in heterodox economics. It was obvious from the noisy discussion that there is going to be no easy soothing of historiographic sensibilities by heterodox economists' claims to have uncovered better ways to do economics by re-presenting the canonical texts of Marx, Sraffa, Hayek, or Keynes. To put it bluntly, some historians at the conference believe that heterodox economics has produced very little historically interesting scholarship (Sraffa editing Ricardo to the contrary notwithstanding), nor is it likely to do so, since that is not its purpose.
The sociological track of the conference developed concerns about the institutional health of the arrangements by which the subdiscipline has organized itself. For the marginalization of our subdiscipline is quite real. My colleague Craufurd Goodwin argued me out of titling the conference-and this volume-"Does the History of Economics Have Any Future?" I allowed his optimism with respect to the answer to trump my own pessimism. That pessimism, however, is not chimerical. Conference essays by Ted Gayer and Roger Backhouse document the increasingly difficult time historians of economics are having in the United States and Great Britain in securing resources for training new entrants into the profession. In the United States, the subdiscipline, as represented in Ph.D. programs, is in near free fall, with little on the horizon to provide a safe landing. This theme is reflected in the set of essays by young members of the profession. Those by Derek Brown and Shauna Saunders, Matthias Klaes, Steve Meardon, and Esther-Mirjam Sent detail the difficulty "our young" have in defending an interest in the history of economics in graduate education and, once defended, the difficulties in finding a place to practice our craft. During the conference, this line of argument produced great consternation among older members of the subdiscipline. A few of the youngest members of the profession were told, curiously, to be more cheerful, and that there are many jobs out there for historians of economics, as long as one is not interested in teaching in North American Ph.D. programs. However, the next generation of economists are being trained in precisely those programs, and if there is no one in those programs presenting the history of economics either in courses or in model behavior for scholarship, the audience for history of economics will become quite similar to the audience for history of chemistry in chemistry departments: nil. It was also argued that this state of affairs provides some opportunities for economists with historical interests to take up positions on undergraduate faculties or in liberal arts colleges. Brad Bateman's essay points out the possibilities in this area, although the pressures on liberal arts colleges to conform to the standard of Ph.D. training in economics, as the technical discipline increasingly shapes the undergraduate experience, is quite real and appears unrelenting. Evelyn Forget's comment on that session, one of two essays I solicited after the conference, captures well the spirit of the discussions.
To be sure, the situation is not the same in all countries. Reports from Ghislain Deleplace on France, Bertram Schefold on Germany, and Cristina Marcuzzo and Annalisa Rosselli on Italy suggest that the structure of the subdiscipline, as it is institutionally embedded within the educational practices of each country, makes the issue not so much resources as cross-disciplinary activity and respect among the larger profession of economists. Aiko Ikeo argued that in Japan, historically quite different with respect to the institutions and the place of the history of economics, the subdiscipline is fairly healthy, although quite disconnected from the kinds of historiographic practices becoming more common in North America and Europe. Practice in Australia and New Zealand, as discussed by John Lodewijks, is heavily shaped by the connection of economists in those countries to the Cambridge traditions in the history of economics and may not survive with great vigor a generation past Peter Groenewegen's and Geoffrey Harcourt's retirements.
These arguments produced strong feelings at the conference associated with individuals' beliefs that they either were or were not participating in a formerly respectable but now degenerating Lakatosian research program. Although John Davis, past president of the History of Economics Society, painted a positive picture of those annual North American meetings, discussion did bring out some consequences of their inclusiveness. Does the policy of the HES to accept virtually all papers offered for presentation at its annual meeting, in a desire to encourage members of the subdiscipline, result in a low average quality? What metric could be used to assess this? Is the role of the Society to promote this inclusiveness, or is it to establish norms for peer review? The conferees were quite divided on this point, although they agreed to sign a letter to the HES encouraging it to explore new arrangements to enrich the annual meetings.
The reports from the editors of journals-Steven Medema, Craufurd Goodwin, José Luís Cardoso, John Lodewijks-generally paint a different picture from the reports on graduate training. Journal editors are quite pleased by the large number of articles crossing their desks and believe that their number is a measure of the health and vitality of the subdiscipline. Nevertheless, the difficulty of establishing the merits of the journals, because of the noninclusion of most subdisciplinary journals other than HOPE and JHET in the Social Sciences Citation Index, means that our journals are only weakly present in the hierarchies for citation studies and concomitant journal rankings. Thus the Research Assessment Exercise of the British Higher Education Funding Council, North American tenure review committees, and departmental or college external review teams in the United States cannot do the kinds of assessments in history of economics increasingly demanded by resource managers. And although it may be boorish to mention it, high rates of journal submissions and publications in the history of economics may mean, in the absence of any metrics, that historians of economics are producing more pages, to be read by fewer individuals, to even less effect on scholarship over time. This is related to the question of book publication in the history of economics. We had a brief discussion at the conference about the quality of books being published in various series in the history of economics, although there was no systematic analysis of this issue. Nevertheless, at least in North American universities, historians of economics are being asked to publish articles if they wish to be promoted as economists but to publish books to satisfy scholars in the humanities that the subdiscipline is really historical. This is producing our own contribution to the movement that has been recently decried by the director of Harvard University Press, that of publishing more books of lower quality as young faculty are told the rule is one book and a book proposal for tenure, two books and a proposal for a professorship (Waters 2001) . The HOPE 2001 conferees, however, did not pursue this set of issues. The fact that many of us were either editors or on the editorial boards of book series that often publish nearly unedited masters and doctoral dissertations at high prices may account for the silence.
What we had at the conference then was a multiple voiced examination, across countries, approaches to economics, institutional settings, and craft-commitments, of the state of our subdiscipline shaped by the kinds of perspectives economists bring to problems. Because this conference was the first opportunity historians of economics have had to debate the future of the subdiscipline, at least since the History of Economics Society and the History of Political Economy were formed as entities more than thirty years ago, the discussions were heated and convoluted. The variety of positions represented make forecasting the subdiscipline's health problematic. Moreover, the international structure of the subdiscipline is intertwined with the globalization of educational initiatives more generally, as the American fetish of evaluation is now constraining institutional behavior in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. Since research assessment is the golden shovel that digs up dollars, pounds, yen, or euros for scholarship, when economists assess the history of economics in this way there are real and increasing burdens on the subdiscipline to behave differently. The historicization of these moves, the context called globalization or Americanization, 3 was only alluded to in discussion at the conference, for the self-reflexive nature of such an activity presented real problems for the historians assembled to contextualize themselves and their own concerns. It is thus left to me as director of the conference, and editor of the volume that represents what was delivered at the conference, to share my own perspective, which is additionally reflected in the selection of essays that follow.
As the twenty-first century unfolds, it is less likely that economics will be a happy home for the history of economics. In the major American research universities, economic statistics has migrated to departments of statistics, research and teaching in economic policy are now moving to departments and schools of public policy, political economy has moved to political science departments, and management studies are migrating to departments of management and of sociology. Whether we like it or not, the internationalization of education is shaped by the practices in those universities, sooner or later. That graduate students in economics are taught using the same textbooks in the United States, China, 3. For the globalization issues with respect to economics, see Coats 1997. Italy, and Canada simply reflects the fact that mathematics students in those countries likewise use the same mathematics texts, and the same is true for chemists and neurobiologists. Globalization is real, and higher education is, like Hollywood and rock music, mostly made in America. The age of the contemplative economist-scholar, at home equally among classical languages, the history of ideas, and mathematical theory, has passed. For the subdisciplinary community in which, for a variety of reasons, I find myself at home (Weintraub 2002, chap. 8) , there are going to be interesting challenges to face over the coming decades. They were well articulated by Margaret Schabas and her commentators in 1992 4 and reprised at this conference. Namely, with which larger scholarly communities will the history of economics share permeable boundaries: economics, history, literature, philosophy, sociology, science studies? Closure was not achieved, however, as every one of these fields was endorsed by at least two of the HOPE 2001 conferees. Thus one could be optimistic that the history of economics will turn out to be a robust field as it is nurtured and tied to so many interesting communities. Alternatively, perhaps one should be pessimistic that the history of economics has no real loving home.
For me, were a single scale of optimist = 10 and pessimist = 0 to represent the possible perspectives on the future of the subdiscipline of economics called the history of economics, 3 would be my upper bound.
